RIVALRY IN PRICE AND VARIETY AMONG
SUPERMARKET RETAILERS
TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS AND STEPHEN F. HAMILTON
Recent theoretical models of retail competition suggest that product heterogeneity is critical to retail
price and variety strategies. This article provides empirical evidence on supermarket retailers’ price
and variety strategies using a nested constant elasticity of substitution (NCES) modeling framework.
The model is estimated using chain-level scanner data for four major grocery chains in a large, urban
West Coast market. The results show that retailers compete for market share using both price and
variety. While they all tend to follow moderately cooperative pricing strategies, the extent to which
they follow cooperative strategies in variety is less homogeneous.
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Between 1980 and 1999, the average number
of products stocked in the U.S. supermar
kets increased threefold from 14,145 to 49,225
(Food Marketing Institute 2004).1 It is not clear
whether this trend reﬂects a more competitive
retail industry, or an industry that supports
higher margins through various forms of nonprice competition. Certainly, there is some
cause for concern, as growth in the aver
age number of products stocked in the su
permarkets increases retail ﬁxed costs and
limits the ability of smaller food retailers
to enter the market. However, to the ex
tent that greater product variety creates bet
ter matches between consumers and brands,
growth in the number of products tends
to increase consumer spending in supermar
kets, and this raises the return to retailers
from attracting customers to their stores. A
greater number of products can thus intensify
retail price competition between supermar
kets and produce similar effects as poten
tial competition from entrants. Does product
variety selection play a strategic role for su
permarkets? And, if so, what is the effect
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In the year 2000, 16,390 new ﬂavors, colors, or varieties of prod
ucts were introduced, compared with 2,689 in 1980.

of product variety choices on retail price com
petition?
This article describes an empirical frame
work that we use to test the nature of price
and variety competition among multiproduct
retailers. Unlike previous empirical work that
considers only retail competition in prices, a
structural approach allows us to consider re
tail competition as arising jointly through the
selection of prices and product variety. Specif
ically, the model nests consumer demand at
both the ﬁrm (or chain) and the product level in
a single utility-maximization problem that ex
plicitly accounts for the endogeneity of price
and variety strategies.
A number of studies consider treat gro
cery retailers as local monopolists (Slade 1995;
Besanko, Gupta, and Jain 1998; Dhar et al.
2003). This assumption is based on the
evidence that consumers base their storeselection decisions on attributes unrelated
to market prices, such as location, cleanli
ness, service, and product variety (Walters and
McKenzie 1988). That is, retailers may use
these various forms of nonprice competition to
differentiate themselves into local monopoly
markets. Moreover, it is also the case that shop
pers generally ﬁnd it easier to compare prices
across products within a store than to compare
prices of common products across retail stores
(Slade 1995), and this also tends to promote
localized brand competition.2 Under this view,
providing product variety would serve as an
2
Throughout this article, we use the terms “store,” “chain,” and
“ﬁrm” interchangably as our interest is in ﬁrm-level strategies and

instrument for retailers to extract multiprod
uct monopoly rents from consumers through
“portfolio” pricing.
But it is also possible that greater retail
product variety stimulates price competition.
For example, if consumers base their storeselection decisions on retailer location, then
providing more varieties can spread consumer
transportation cost over a greater number of
goods, effectively reducing the extent of nonprice retailer differentiation at the individual
product level where pricing occurs. Indeed,
a cursory examination of the recent ﬁnan
cial performance of U.S. supermarket chains
reveals that the rate of turnover in grocery
store ownership appears to better approximate
what we might expect to see under perfect
competition. It is well known, moreover, that
supermarket managers seek to maintain the
competitiveness of their stores across entire
categories of goods, and accordingly set prices
in a manner that takes rival retail prices into
account (McLaughlin, et al. 1999). This idea
that retailers are not impervious to competi
tive market forces is consistent with an emerg
ing body of evidence which suggests that the
local monopoly view of retailing is not strictly
true (Chintagunta 2002; Chintagunta, Dube,
and Singh 2002; Richards and Patterson 2005a;
2005b).
In this article, we take the view that con
sumers make two discrete decisions before
purchasing a product: (1) which retailer to visit;
and (2) which products to buy from a particular
retailer. Shopping in this framework originates
from a need. The consumer runs out of prod
ucts x, y, and z, and then decides how to satisfy
this need by choosing from among ﬁrms i, j, and
k. The element of consumer store choice tends
to stimulate intense price and nonprice com
petition among retailers. However, once con
sumers arrive at their store choices, retailers
exercise local monopoly power. Because re
tail price discrimination is generally not possi
ble between consumers who are shopping for
brands and consumers who are shopping for
stores, retailers use prices and other means, inour data are aggregated over all individual stores within each chain.
Because our data do not describe the many potential dimensions
of nonprice competition among supermarket retailers (location,
cleanliness, advertising, etc.), we focus our objectives on a discus
sion of variety. Other factors are assumed to be included in chainlevel ﬁxed-effects estimates. It is important to note that we assume
prices are set at the chain, rather than individual store level. Given
that our data are aggregated to the ﬁrm level and we observe many
products for which the price stays at a recognizable price point, for
example, $1.79 per pound, for several weeks, it is clear that this
price is set for every store in the entire chain. Personal communi
cation with store managers for two of the sample ﬁrms supports
this empirical evidence.

cluding variety provision, to forge a compro
mise between these two roles.
We test the model using weekly sales data
within the fresh fruit category in supermar
kets in the greater Los Angeles (LA) area.
Fresh fruit sold at LA supermarkets is an ideal
product category to study variety decisions for
several reasons. First, fresh fruit represents
a unique opportunity to study competition
that is not driven by manufacturer promotion
programs, category management, or obliga
tions created under slotting or pay-to-stay fee
agreements. Second, LA represents an ideal
case study because there are a small number
of retailers who dominate the retail market,
each retailer follows a price-promotional strat
egy (HI-LO) as opposed to an every-day-low
price (EDLP) strategy, and Wal-Mart, which
does not participate in any national scannerdata syndication services, does not sell gro
ceries in the area.3 Third, fresh fruit is an
unbranded commodity (or else symmetrically
branded across retailers), and not sold un
der independent retailer private labels. Fourth,
fresh fruit at LA supermarkets is priced on a
chain-wide basis for each retailer, so that fresh
fruit prices do not differ among stores within
each retail chain. Finally, survey research
ﬁnds fresh fruit and vegetable quality and
availability to be among the most important
considerations consumers take into account in
choosing a supermarket.4 This allows for a rel
atively straightforward empirical examination
of whether grocery retailers compete in prices,
variety, both prices and variety, or are insulated
entirely from either form of competition.
The remainder of the article is organized
as follows. The next section reviews the back
ground literature. The third section delineates
the empirical model. The fourth section dis
cusses data and estimation methods, and the
ﬁfth section presents the results.
Background
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976)
were among the ﬁrst to develop formal models
of product variety and price. The models follow
3
A HI-LO business model is one in which the retailer maintains
a relatively high shelf price, but periodically offers signiﬁcant dis
counts. EDLP retailers, on the other hand, maintain shelf prices
that are as low as possible and rarely offer specials or discounts.
Wal-Mart is an example of the latter, while Albertsons is an exam
ple of the former.
4
Eighty-ﬁve percent of consumers regard high-quality fruits and
vegetables to be “very important” to their choice of store (Food
Marketing Institute 2004), and only cleanliness rates higher among
store attributes.

along traditional lines of monopolistic compe
tition in the sense that product proliferation
emerges as an equilibrium condition through
tension between the cost of developing new
products and the role of new products in in
creasing total product demand through port
folio effects. Each product is produced by an
individual ﬁrm, and ﬁrms (products) enter the
industry until demand for brands is no longer
sufﬁcient to recover entry costs. More recently,
Raubitschek (1987) extends the constant elas
ticity of substitution (CES) model of Dixit and
Stiglitz by replacing the equilibrium condition
with a two-stage optimization process in which
a centralized manager for each ﬁrm selects the
number of brands to offer in the ﬁrst stage,
and then each brand is priced independently
by individual brand managers in the second
stage. This approach ignores the coordination
of pricing decisions across retail products.
Anderson and de Palma (1992) make the
useful distinction that differentiation often
results in the selection of only one retail store
and only one product, for example, a shoe
store. They develop a model of price and va
riety competition in which consumers select
among stores, and then products within stores,
according to a nested logit framework. In
equilibrium, they argue, greater heterogene
ity among retailers leads to less variety, while
greater heterogeneity among products within
each store promotes variety. However, it is well
understood that the nested logit model, while
more general than a simple logit in the sense
that it allows for store and product hetero
geneity through extreme-value scale parame
ters, leads to unrealistic substitution patterns
among products within each nest.5 The nested
logit approach also implies that a corner solu
tion must exist at each choice level. de Palma
et al. (1994) apply this framework to explain
spatial competition among video store owners
in prices and variety, but do not formally test
the implications of the theory.6 Watson (2004)
formally tests a variety and price game of this
form under circumstances of endogenous loca
tion choices and ﬁnds that variety is a concave
function of the number of local competitors.
5
The basic problem with the logit model is the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (iia) property, which means that “ . . . the
ratio of the probabilities for any two alternatives is indepen
dent of the existence and attributes of any other alternative . . . ”
(Brownstone and Train 1999, p. 110). While the nested logit model
avoids the iia property between different nests, the model is still
subject to this criticism with respect to the choice of products from
within a particular nest.
6
The authors address a speciﬁc example, but do not formally
test the hypotheses.

Strategic product proliferation is important
in a nonspatial sense as well. Brander and
Eaton (1984) develop a model of strategic pre
emption in which producers of substitutable
products are likely to monopolize a partic
ular market segment in order to deter en
try. Hamilton (2003) synthesizes these two
branches of the modeling literature by combin
ing a discrete store-choice model with a model
of within-store product choice. This model al
lows for heterogeneity among retail ﬁrms as
well as heterogeneity among brands, and, un
like Anderson and de Palma, considers contin
uous quantity choices and an outside option.
The outcome is that greater retailer hetero
geneity leads to a smaller provision of product
variety, whereas greater heterogeneity among
products sold by each ﬁrm has an ambiguous
effect on variety. The reason for this is that
greater product heterogeneity increases retail
margins, which increases the return to new
product introductions, but higher prices also
dampen retail sales per brand by facilitating
substitution to the outside good. The present
article provides an empirical test of these the
oretical predictions.
Few empirical studies have examined prod
uct variety decisions in retail markets. Indeed,
virtually all previous empirical research on
the competitive aspects of product variety is
directed at the manufacturing level, where
“product lines” are typically comprised of a
small set of related brands and competitors are
few (Bayus and Putsis 1999; Kadiyali, Vilcas
sim, and Chintagunta, 1996, 1999; Dobson and
Kalish 1988; Oren, Smith, and Wilson 1984).
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) design and es
timate a repeated two-period noncooperative
oligopoly model among the U.S. cigarette man
ufacturers in which the number of brands is
a key determinant of demand, but the num
ber of varieties to offer is not treated as a
strategic choice variable. Models of productline competition in the empirical literature are
commonly speciﬁed at the level of individual
brands using product-level conduct parame
ters, while the proliferation decision, itself, is
either treated as exogenous (Kadiyali, Vilcas
sim, and Chintagunta 1996; 1999) or without
any reference to a structural model of com
petition (Bayus and Putsis). Kadiyali, Vilcas
sim, and Chintagunta (1999) demonstrate that
yogurt producers are able to acquire market
power through the portfolio effect of offer
ing a greater array of products, as a larger
range of products effectively reduces a mea
sure of the elasticity of demand over their

whole product line. Draganska and Jain (2005)
recognize the strategic importance of productline length and estimate a model in which the
number of varieties offered per product line,
as well as the price of the products, are en
dogenous determinants of retail demand. Dra
ganska and Jain follow Berry (1994), Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2000,
2001) in specifying a logit demand model in
which product differentiation is reﬂected in
discrete consumer choices. Although the deci
sion to introduce new products is presumably
to attract new customers and/or increase the
level of consumption of each customer, both of
which can be accomplished by creating better
matches between consumers and brands, none
of these studies explicitly consider the effect of
product differentiation on the nature of retail
market competition.
Empirical Model of Variety Competition
In this section, we develop an econometric
model that includes structural equations for:
(1) equilibrium prices, (2) equilibrium variety
(number of products per ﬁrm), and (3) the
market share of each ﬁrm. Rivalry in either
price or variety, in turn, will be largely deter
mined by the degree of differentiation between
ﬁrms, the extent of product differentiation, dif
ferences in marginal cost (wholesale price),
and differences in ﬁxed retailing costs. Both
the degree of product differentiation and ﬁrm
differentiation, however, are unobserved to
the econometrician. Therefore, the economet
ric procedure estimates both product and ﬁrm
differentiation as unknown parameters.
Berry; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes;
Ackerberg and Rysman (2002), and Nevo
(2000, 2001), among others, explicitly account
for unobserved product differentiation within
a discrete choice framework by treating the
extent of differentiation as a latent variable
inﬂuencing both competition and demand.
These studies identify the extent of differ
entiation in structural supply and demand
models in which consumer utility is a function
of both observed and unobserved product
characteristics. In this context, differentiation
is inherent in the product itself, and this
necessarily assumes away any further differ
entiation created by other channel members.
Dhar and Cotterill (2003), on the other hand,
argue that products purchased in retail super
markets are differentiated in two dimensions:
(1) from other products in the same store

according to their embodied attributes, and
(2) from similar products sold by other ﬁrms
on the basis of store characteristics. This
implies that a two-stage model of ﬁrm and
product choice is required to estimate the
degree of substitutability both among ﬁrms
and among products within ﬁrms. We adopt
a similar conceptual approach here, although
we employ fundamentally different methods.7
There are several ways to represent the twostage choice process, depending on whether
each stage is regarded as discrete (one alter
native is chosen) or continuous (several can
be chosen). Hanemann (1984) develops an
econometric framework based on Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980, p. 262) that integrates the
discrete choice among brands and the con
tinuous choice of quantity in a single utilitymaximization problem. Vaage (2000) applies
this model to Norwegian appliance and power
demand, while Chiang (1991), Chintagunta
(1993), Richards (2000), and van Oest, Paap,
and Franses (2004) consider discrete choices
among brands and continuous quantity pur
chases. Although this approach accommodates
discrete / continuous choices in a theoretically
consistent way, substitution among brands is
driven entirely by their market share and
not by fundamental attributes of the choice
itself (Nevo 2001) and the price-response
parameter in the brand-choice model is con
strained to −1.0. Hendel (1999); Kim, Allenby,
and Rossi (2002); and Dube (2004) develop
more general models of discrete / continuous
choice designed to address the problem
of “multiple discreteness”—when consumers
buy several ﬂavors or varieties of the same ba
sic product on each trip to the store. Although
these models are able to accommodate deci
sions that consist of a mixture of discrete and
continuous outcomes, they are more appropri
ate for household-level data where true corner
solutions are observed.
A logical and intuitive alternative to the dis
crete / continuous approach followed by the
studies cited above is a nested logit similar
to Anderson and de Palma (1992) de Palma
et al. (1994), and Dhar and Cotterill (2003). Al
though retail grocery shoppers do indeed make
a discrete choice among ﬁrms, the subsequent
choice among products, and the quantities of
each, are more appropriately considered to
7
Note that it is not strictly necessary to use any type of twostage approach in order to recover store- and product-substitution
elasticities. Villas-Boas (2003) uses a set of brand-store dummy
variables in a single-level logit model to accomplish the same task.

be continuous. Consequently, we adopt an ap
proach that offers both a more general treat
ment of substitutability among products, while
retaining the nested decision logic inherent
in shoppers’ decisions between quality differ
entiated ﬁrms and products within ﬁrms—the
nested CES (NCES).
The NCES model has several advantages.
The model permits general substitution rela
tionships among alternatives, is parsimonious
in parameter space, allows for complementar
ity, has the potential to be ﬂexible, and ﬁnally,
appears to perform well in empirical applica
tion (Brown and Heien 1972; Morey, Brefﬂe,
and Greene, 2001).8 As our focus is on the
choice made during a single shopping occasion,
we assume that a household maximizes utility
over the products purchased on each shopping
trip. Further, we assume that the consumer ﬁrst
chooses among the products she wishes to buy,
and then decides from which ﬁrm to purchase
the entire bundle, based on considerations of
both cost and inherent quality of the ﬁrm’s
stores.
Using a two-level NCES speciﬁcation, the
indirect utility function for this problem is
written as:
(1) V ( pij , y)
⎡
�
�(1−)/(1−i ) ⎤1/(1−)
Ni
I
�
�
⎦
=⎣
p̂ 1ij−i
y
i=1

j=1

where y is income,  i is the elasticity of substi
tution among j products in ﬁrm i, and  is the
elasticity of substitution among ﬁrms (and the
outside option) in a given market. Analogous
to the nested logit model of price and vari
ety competition of Anderson and de Palma
(1992),  i represents the degree of heterogene
ity among products within a given ﬁrm (prod
uct heterogeneity) and  represents the degree
of heterogeneity among ﬁrms (retailer hetero
geneity). Concavity requires  k ∈ [ 0, ∞) and,
to allow for the possibility of corner solutions
with respect to ﬁrm choice,  > 1.
For retailers who sell many highly substi
tutable products with little heterogeneity (e.g.,
a seller of submarine sandwiches)  i is likely
to be high relative to  . However, for retailers

8
Brown and Heien (1972) call their NCES model the S-branch
utility tree. This speciﬁcation was, however, later criticized by
Blackorby, Boyce, and Russell (1978) because it implies that pref
erences are afﬁne homothetic. They reject this attribute of the Sbranch model by specifying a more general Gorman Polar Form
model that nests the S-branch as a special case.

who sell products meeting many different and
diverse needs, like supermarkets, substitution
among ﬁrms is likely to be greater than within
ﬁrms. Anderson and de Palma (1992) main
tain that retail markets with a high degree
of product heterogeneity are likely to have
a few ﬁrms offering many different products,
whereas markets with a high degree of retailer
heterogeneity tend to have more ﬁrms, but
more limited offerings. This is because retailer
heterogeneity has no effect on variety provi
sion in their model, and serves only to increase
prices. Hamilton (2003) argues that greater re
tailer heterogeneity raises retail prices, but re
duces product variety and stimulates retailer
entry by reducing ﬁxed costs of entry. Al
though the number of ﬁrms is not endoge
nous in our model, we nonetheless are able
to test these hypotheses regarding the number
of products offered within each retail outlet.
Prices are adjusted for the inherent
“quality” of each product and ﬁrm in a man
ner similar to that suggested by Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980), and Hanemann (1984) so
that corner solutions result from a utilitymaximizing decision. Speciﬁcally, we multiply
observed prices by a quality index function,� ij .
Because the quality index must be strictly pos
itive, we use an exponential form in various
quality attributes:
(2)

�ij = (exp(1ij + 2ij z ij + 3ij zpij + 4ij Ni
+ 5ij m 1 + 6ij m 2 + 7ij m 3 ))i /(1−i )

where 1ij is an idiosyncratic preference pa
rameter, zij is a binary variable indicating
whether or not the product was on a promo
tion during the week, zpij is an interaction
term between the promotion dummy and shelf
price,N i is the number of products offered by
ﬁrm i, and mk are seasonal dummy variables.
Multiplying � by the price provides a qual
ity adjusted price so that p̂ij = �ij pij for each
j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N i products per ﬁrm and i =
1, 2, 3, . . . , I ﬁrms. Each quality index must be
CES in order to ensure that the price aggrega
tor remains CES. Further, by multiplying each
price by � ij we retain the central insight pro
vided by Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980) ap
proach, namely if the ratio of price to quality
is lower for good A than B, ceteris paribus,
then good A will be chosen. This is a discrete
choice, or a corner solution. Applying Roy’s
Identity to (1) and simplifying provides the
share equations for each choice of ﬁrm and
product:

�
(3)

Sij =

i
p̂ 1−
ij

��

Pi1−

�

�N

� Ni

1− i
j=1 p̂ ij

1−
i=1 Pi

� Ni 1−i 1/(1−i )
where Pi = ( j=1
p̂ ij )
is the price
aggregator function, or price index, for ﬁrm i
and Sij represents the market share (measured
as the share of total market expenditure) of
product j sold by ﬁrm i . In our application of
the NCES to ﬁrm and product choice, we also
include an outside option to allow for the fact
that shoppers can buy fresh fruit from places
other than the major retail ﬁrms described by
our data. Consequently, share expansion can
indeed represent category growth for any of
the ﬁrms considered here. An estimable form
of (3) is created by expressing each share in
logs and adding an independent and identically
distributed (iid) error term, ij :
(4)

log(Sij ) − (1 − i ) log( p̂ ij )
�
�
Ni
�
1 − i
+ log
p̂ ij
− (1 − )Pi
�
+ log

j=1
I
�

�
Pi1 − 

= 1ij

i=1

for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , I and j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N i . In
the estimation procedure, the set of equations
in (4) are estimated with the log-market share
as the dependent variable. Estimating (4) on
its own, however, provides no information on
how ﬁrms interact in prices and variety.
To gain insight as to how variety effects price
competition, and vice versa, we also specify
a model of the supply side of the retail sec
tor.9 Estimating equations for each ﬁrm’s price
and variety decision is also necessary because
both are clearly endogenous in the NCES
demand model described above. Even if nei
ther prices nor variety are strategic variables
for retailers, as in the competitive model, they
are nevertheless likely to be endogenous for
the more subtle reasons cited by Villas-Boas
and Winer (1999) and Villas-Boas and Zhao
(2003). Namely, both prices and the number of
product types offered for sale are set by retail
managers who are able to observe market sig
nals that are not observable to the researcher.
9
Our focus here is on interaction only among retailers. Studies by
Choi (1991), and more recently Sudhir (2001) and Villas-Boas and
Zhao (2003), formally model the nature of manufacturer-retailer
interactions but assume a highly simpliﬁed retail market. VillasBoas (2003) provides a more detailed analysis of vertical relation
ships among retailers and manufacturers of a particular consumerpackaged good.

For example, display alignment, shelf space, instore specials, mass advertising, and supplier
concerns may be taken into account in mar
keting decisions, and these considerations are
unlikely to be independent of price and va
riety outcomes. In order to address these en
dogeneity issues, the demand system in (4) is
estimated using an instrumental variables ap
proach, which we describe in greater detail be
low.
Because the ﬁrst-order conditions for the
NCES system are highly nonlinear, we fol
low Dhar, et al. (2003) in deriving general
ﬁrst-order conditions in terms of elasticities
only.10 Draganska and Jain (2005) also derive
the supply side for ﬁrms that choose both price
and product-line length, but assume Bertrand–
Nash behavior with respect to both variables.
The model used here differs from Draganska
and Jain in that we allow for a more general
Nash behavior and estimate behavior at the
ﬁrm level, rather than at the individual prod
uct level. Focusing on ﬁrm-level strategies has
both logical and practical appeal. First, man
agers in a given city do not compare prices
with rivals’ on an individual product level, but
rather category by category. Second, variety
is more meaningful on a ﬁrm level (number of
produce stock keeping units [SKUs]) than with
respect to individual product lines (number of
different sizes of apple), and this is particularly
true for the fresh produce data used in this arti
cle. Third, for practical reasons, estimating the
entire four-ﬁrm and ﬁve-product model would
create an unreasonably high number of param
eters to estimate, particularly given that we
include both price and variety reactions. As
suming nonjointness of production, the proﬁt
equation for ﬁrm
�i is written as:
i = M
Sij ( pij − cij ) − gi (Ni )
(5)
j∈Ni

= MSi (Pi − Ci ) − gi (Ni )
where M is the total market size, cij is the
marginal cost of retailing, and Pi and Ci are
retail and wholesale CES price indices, respec
tively. This cost is assumed to be separable be
tween wholesaling and a Generalized Leontief
retail unit-cost function, so that unit-retailing
costs are written as:

10
Dhar et al. extend the general notation for the ﬁrst-order con
ditions of a proﬁt maximizing multiproduct ﬁrm presented by Nevo
(2001) by demonstrating that the estimation of conduct parame
ters requires only elasticities from the demand system, along with
measures of cost and other supply shifters as required.

(6)

cij = wij +

�

k  k +

k

��
k

kl (k l )1/2

l

where wij is the wholesale (free on board
[FOB]) price of product j,  k is a vector of input
prices that includes retail labor costs, market
ing costs, and FIRE (ﬁnance, insurance, and
real estate) costs, and  k and  kl are parame
ters to be estimated. Firm proﬁt also includes
certain ﬁxed costs of variety, which encompass
the costs of either developing and marketing
private labels, or introducing and shelving ex
ternal brands. Draganska and Jain (2005) ar
gue that these costs are convex as greater va
riety imposes higher costs on the ﬁrm. To cap
ture this effect, we model variety costs as a
quadratic function: gi (N i ) = i1 N i + 0.5i2 N 2i ,
which, of course, implies linear marginal costs
of variety.
Unlike Draganska and Jain, we allow for
general price and variety behavior by introduc
ing conduct parameters, or conjectural elastici
ties, with respect to both price and variety. Fur
ther, ﬁrms are assumed to form expectations
of others’ reactions to changes in both price
and product line. In other words, we estimate
cross-variable conduct parameters similar to
Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta (1996)
so that we can test for whether ﬁrms respond
to changes in price with changes in product line
and vice versa. In this way, the NCES model
reﬂects an inherently “nested” problem in that
each ﬁrm’s prices and product lines are deter
mined by decisions made within other ﬁrms as
well as for internal considerations. Taking this
into account, the ﬁrst-order condition with re
spect to the price index of retailer i becomes:
�
∂i
∂Si ∂Pk
(7)
(Pi − Ci )
M
= Si M +
∂Pk ∂Pi
∂Pi
k
�
∂Si ∂Nk
+
(Pi − Ci )
M = 0,
∂N
k ∂ Pi
k
k = 1, 2, . . . , I
Similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect
to variety, or product-line length for retailer i
is given by:
�
∂Si ∂Nk
∂i
(8)
M
=
(Pi − Ci )
∂N
∂Ni
k ∂Ni
k
�
∂Si ∂Pk
+
(Pi − Ci )
M − 1i
∂Pk ∂Ni
k
− 2i Ni = 0,

k = 1, 2, . . . , I

where the terms ∂Pk /∂Pi , ∂N k /∂Pi , ∂N k /∂N i ,
∂Pk /∂N i , represent ﬁrm i’s expectation of ﬁrm

k’s response to changes in its chain-wide “aver
age” price and the variety of products on offer.
These equations can be simpliﬁed by writing
each in terms of demand and response elastic
ities (Dhar and Cotterill 2003), and measures
of total category cost (ei ) and revenue (ri ). Do
ing so results in an estimable system of price :
(9)

ri +

�

(ri − ei )εik

ik

+

�

k

(ri − ei )

ik ik

k

= 2i ,

k = 1, 2, . . . , I

and variety equations:
�
(10)

1i Ni − 2i Ni2 − (ri − ei )
+

�

ik

+

�
ik ik
k

�
εik

ii

= 3i ,

k = 1, 2, . . . , I

k

where ε ik is the price elasticity of demand of
product i with respect to the price of ﬁrm k, ik
is the “variety elasticity” of demand of prod
uct i with respect to the number of products
offered by k, ik is the conjectural elasticity of
ﬁrm k’s price with respect to a change in ﬁrm
i’s price, ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm
k’s product-line length with respect to ﬁrm i’s
price, ik is the elasticity of ﬁrm k’s variety re
sponse to an increase in offerings by ﬁrm i, ik
is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price re
sponse to a change in ﬁrm i’s variety, and 2i
and 3i are econometric error terms. The ex
pression for retailing costs in (6) is substituted
into (9) and (10) prior to estimation.
As a result, the entire system consists of two
blocks of equations: (1) the demand block de
scribed in (4) that consists of 20 equations (four
stores with ﬁve products each), (2) the price
and variety response block described in (9) and
(10) that consists of eight equations in total—
four price response equations and four vari
ety response equations. While estimation of
the entire system together would be preferable
on efﬁciency grounds, the size of the problem
requires a sequential estimation approach in
which the cross-equation restrictions implied
by the previous stage are imposed at each iter
ation. As explained in greater detail below, all
parameter estimates are obtained by nonlin
ear three-stage least squares (NL3SLS) within
each block of equations. Because NL3SLS is a
nonlinear estimation method, each equation is
estimated with the dependent variable in im
plicit form as shown in (9)–(10) above.

Data and Estimation Methods
The retail price, quantity, and promotional
data base consists of two years (January 1998–
December 1999) of weekly scanner data for
ﬁve products in a single category (fresh fruit)
from four major supermarket ﬁrms in the LA
market.11 Retailer-speciﬁc data are used to
identify competitive interactions among the
four retail ﬁrms, while product-speciﬁc data
provide the measure of heterogeneity among
products within each ﬁrm. Because we are in
terested in ﬁrm-level pricing and variety strate
gies, the data are aggregated over all stores for
each of the four chains. Scanner data for per
ishable products comprises a number of unique
items per product deﬁnition, depending upon
whether it is bagged or bulk, small or large, or
of a particular variety, so we aggregate over
individual price-look-up (PLU) codes to the
product level for red delicious apples, granny
smith apples, fuji apples, bananas, and grapes.
Variety is then measured by a simple PLU
count for each aggregate product.
The input price data are from various sec
ondary sources. Weekly wholesale prices for
the sample of fruits represented here are from
the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of
the USDA (grapes), the Washington Grow
ers’ Clearing House (apples), or the Ecuador
Ministry of Agriculture (bananas) and repre
sent shipping-point FOB prices. Retailing costs
are measured by an index of wages in retail
and wholesale trade, an index of marketing
costs, and a composite index of FIRE costs, all
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). All
input-price indices, however, are only available
on a monthly basis. Therefore, the price in each
week is ﬁrst set equal to the associated monthly
price, and then converted to weekly series us
ing a linear ﬁlter similar to Slade (1995) and
Besanko, Gupta, and Jain (1998):
(11)

kt = 0.25ˆ k,t−1 + 0.50ˆ k,t + 0.25ˆ k,t+1

for input price index k .
In order to capture retail competition at
the ﬁrm level, all prices represent per-product,
per-ﬁrm averages and all quantities are ex
pressed on a per-ﬁrm basis. Therefore, each
grocery chain is essentially regarded as one
ﬁrm with multiple locations. Further, the “out
side option” is calculated in a manner similar
to Nevo (2001). Speciﬁcally, LA residents are
11

All of the retail scanner data are from Fresh Look Marketing
Group, Chicago, IL.

assumed to consume each fresh fruit at the na
tional average rate. U.S. per capital fruit con
sumption values (Economic Research Service
(ERS) USDA) are then multiplied by the pop
ulation of LA county (the market area of the
sample ﬁrms) to obtain a total market con
sumption value for each fruit. Prices for each
component of the outside option are calculated
as expenditure-weighted averages of each type
of fruit in the sample. The outside option is
then the difference between total LA expendi
ture and that represented by the sample ﬁrms.
Any error can be due to differences between
LA and national consumption rates, or to fruit
purchased outside of the retail channel repre
sented here. If these errors are random, then
the parameter estimates remain valid.12
Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of
the data used to estimate the demand, pricing,
and variety equations at the individual ﬁrm
level, while table 2 shows descriptive statis
tics for market-level variables. The data show
considerable heterogeneity, both among retail
ﬁrms and among products within each ﬁrm.
For example, Firm 2 offers the lowest aver
age price, or next to lowest, for all ﬁve prod
ucts, but also shows the greatest variability in
price among all sample ﬁrms. This suggests that
it uses a HI-LO strategy more aggressively
than the others. Firm 1, on the other hand,
has the smallest market share for all ﬁve prod
ucts and also offers the least variety among all
ﬁrms. Firm 3 maintains the broadest offering
of fresh fruit, but also has the highest prices
for most products, with the exception of ba
nanas, for which it has the lowest price. It is
often suggested that retailers use bananas as a
loss leader due to their broad appeal to a large
number of consumers, and ﬁrm 3 may be us
ing loss leadership to generate sales for other,
high-margin products within its product line.
Whether this is in fact the case, however, re
quires more detailed empirical analysis. Firm 4
has the largest market share for the ﬁve sample
products (24.3%), while ﬁrm 1 has the smallest
market share (10.9%). The ﬁrms are relatively
similar in terms of the variability of market
share as they are clustered between a coefﬁ
cient of variation of 35.6% (ﬁrm 3) and 45.4%
(ﬁrm 2). At the market level, table 2 shows that
all wholesale prices were very volatile over the
sample period—each has a coefﬁcient of vari
ation of over 50%. Further, the outside option,
12
See Nevo (2000, 2001) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
for an extensive discussion of the role and construction of the out
side option in discrete choice models.

Table 1. Summary of LA Retail Scanner Data—Chain Level, January 1998—December 1999
Chain 1

Chain 3
Max.

Mean

S. D.

Min.

Max.

N

0.409
0.688
0.629
0.311
0.777
0.004
0.002
0.000
0.009
0.009
37.000
Chain 2

1.237 p13
1.242 p23
1.699 p33
0.603 p43
3.320 p53
0.041 S13
0.021 S23
0.014 S33
0.059 S43
0.112 S53
64.000 N 3

0.920
0.934
1.224
0.606
2.057
0.021
0.014
0.013
0.108
0.087
70.529

0.104
0.105
0.225
0.049
0.513
0.009
0.006
0.008
0.018
0.059
6.641

0.642
0.556
0.516
0.293
0.812
0.003
0.005
0.001
0.068
0.004
53.000
Chain 4

1.223
1.313
1.989
0.697
3.912
0.069
0.037
0.058
0.200
0.281
83.000

104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104

0.424
0.440
0.578
0.373
0.752
0.010
0.006
0.000
0.052
0.011
63.000

0.951 p14
1.131 p24
1.577 p34
0.597 p44
2.946 p54
0.053 S14
0.023 S24
0.021 S34
0.148 S44
0.302 S54
83.000 N 4

0.936
0.987
1.432
0.531
2.274
0.019
0.012
0.010
0.102
0.048
77.328

0.064
0.052
0.147
0.022
0.551
0.010
0.004
0.005
0.009
0.040
9.547

0.650
0.796
0.985
0.433
1.568
0.012
0.007
0.002
0.080
0.008
59.000

1.086
1.082
1.677
0.575
4.087
0.067
0.038
0.047
0.123
0.224
97.000

104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104

Mean

S. D.

Min.

p11
p21
p31
p41
p51
S11
S21
S31
S41
S51
N1

0.983
0.983
1.214
0.558
1.849
0.015
0.008
0.006
0.035
0.045
52.606

0.116
0.134
0.196
0.044
0.455
0.006
0.004
0.003
0.010
0.025
5.054

p12
p22
p32
p42
p52
S12
S22
S32
S42
S52
N2

0.791
0.857
1.050
0.565
1.982
0.022
0.011
0.007
0.086
0.079
73.663

0.129
0.136
0.257
0.027
0.460
0.008
0.004
0.004
0.015
0.062
4.671

a In

this table, pji is the price of product j in ﬁrm i, and Sji is the marginal market share (i.e., share of the entire market) of product j in ﬁrm i . The products
are indexed as follows: j = 1 is red delicious apples, j = 2 is granny smith apples, j = 3 is fuji apples, j = 4 is bananas, and j = 5 is grapes. Firm names are not
disclosed for reasons of conﬁdentiality. The variable N i measures the number of distinct SKUs within each ﬁrm i.

or fruit not purchased from any of the sample
retailers, consists of only 25% of the market,
so that our data on the top four retailers in
cludes the majority of purchases made in the
LA retail produce market.
Although estimating (4), (9), and (10) to
gether is preferred on efﬁciency grounds, the
Table 2. Summary of LA Retail Scanner
Data—Market Level, January 1998—
December 1999
v1
v2
v3
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
S0

Meana

S.D.

Min

Max

N

3.215
6.614
3.123
0.257
0.337
0.352
0.209
0.156
0.250

0.081
0.223
0.052
0.039
0.029
0.079
0.060
0.062
0.139

3.011
6.075
2.953
0.190
0.282
0.211
0.113
0.088
0.073

3.409
7.025
3.226
0.330
0.439
0.584
0.338
0.380
0.504

104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104
104

a In this table, v is input price i for i = 1, 2, 3; w is FOB (wholesale) price j for
i
j
j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, and S0 is the market share of the outside option. Input prices
are indexed as follows: i = 1 is an index of wages in retail and wholesale
trade, i = 2 is an index of marketing costs, and i = 3 is an index of FIRE costs.

size of the estimation problem required se
quential estimation of the demand and supply,
or price and variety response blocks.13 Elas
ticity estimates from the system of equations
described by (4), therefore, are included in (9)
and (10) in order to recover the conjectural
elasticity estimates. In both systems, however,
prices and variety are clearly endogenous, so
an instrumental variable procedure is used for
each block of equations. Instruments are se
lected that are likely to be correlated with the
dependent variables, yet uncorrelated with the
errors in each equation. For the demand sys
tem, the set of instruments includes the set of
wholesale fresh fruit prices, the supermarket
cost indices described above and lagged val
ues of each product’s retail price, number of
products offered, and market share. Because
of the large number of parameters in the de
mand system, this set of instruments is still not
sufﬁcient to obtain unique estimates of each.
13
The second-stage parameter estimates will be consistent, how
ever, because the values estimated in the ﬁrst stage are appropri
ate instruments for the endogenous quantities in the second-stage
model.

Consequently, we follow Villas-Boas (2003),
and Draganska and Jain (2005) and interact
these instruments with a set of product- and
ﬁrm-binary-indicator variables.
The ﬁrst-stage results of the NL3SLS proce
dure provides us with some reassurance that
the set of instruments is a good one. Regress
ing price on the set of instruments yields an R2
of 0.986, while regressing variety on the same
instruments gives an R2 of 0.983. In the price
regression, 45.7% of the instruments are statis
tically signiﬁcant at a 10% level, while 44.3%
are signiﬁcant in the variety regression. The
same set of instruments are also used to esti
mate the supply block. Both blocks of equa
tions are estimated using NL3SLS.
Price and variety responses by rival ﬁrms
are identiﬁed in the system by the nonlinearity
of demand in both price and variety (VillasBoas). Although the NCES, of course, has

constant elasticities of substitution, price and
variety elasticities vary over time, ﬁrms and
products so there is sufﬁcient variation to iden
tify all the response parameters in the system.
Results and Discussion
We assess the goodness-of-ﬁt of both blocks of
equations with a system R2 as well as a Wald
chi-square test statistic that compares the es
timated and a null model that consists of con
stant terms only. The results in table 3 indi
cate that the model provides a good ﬁt to the
data, providing an R2 value of 0.8051 and eas
ily rejecting the null hypothesis that all popula
tion parameters are zero. Tests of the price and
variety response hypotheses outlined above
are conducted using the conjectural elastic
ity values estimated in the supply-side model.

Table 3. Nested CES Parameter Estimates: LA Retail Fresh Fruit, 1998–99
Firm 1
Parameters
i
1i1
2i1
3i1
4i1
1i2
2i2
3i2
4i2
1i3
2i3
3i3
4i3
1i4
2i4
3i4
4i4
1i5
2i5
3i5
4i5

q
R2
2

Estimate
∗

0.040
6.199∗
1.074
5.963∗
0.096
−18.536∗
−0.569
2.351∗
0.209
23.458∗
−0.807
4.151∗
0.499
−2.297∗
10.730∗
−4.073∗
−0.353
1.541
15.491∗
−5.175∗
0.962∗
0.870∗
1,322.349
0.805
11,214.79∗

Firm 2
SE
0.003
1.023
0.984
1.007
0.262
1.289
0.961
0.984
0.248
1.449
0.975
1.010
0.255
1.132
1.034
1.006
0.282
1.002
1.206
0.879
0.236
0.007

Estimate
∗

0.176
3.620∗
8.705∗
−11.433∗
0.298∗
−0.533
9.526∗
−10.341∗
0.298∗
6.678∗
2.114∗
1.730
0.378∗
7.908∗
22.073∗
−23.600∗
0.109
−4.797∗
2.623∗
−0.985
0.512∗

Firm 3
SE
0.006
1.134
0.977
1.093
0.087
1.051
0.862
1.026
0.085
1.181
1.065
1.009
0.088
1.069
1.427
1.433
0.097
1.130
1.020
0.646
0.098

Estimate
∗

0.123
−0.948
9.082∗
−6.524∗
0.255∗
−2.050
16.586∗
−16.326∗
0.229
15.514∗
0.926
1.959∗
0.285∗
−7.616∗
17.275∗
−9.853∗
0.272∗
−2.413∗
3.772∗
−1.535∗
0.368∗

Firm 4
SE
0.004
1.003
0.905
1.020
0.118
1.224
1.198
1.264
0.118
1.293
0.889
0.979
0.114
1.159
1.097
0.980
0.116
1.035
1.088
0.581
0.128

Estimate
∗

0.202
3.668∗
16.652∗
−17.874∗
0.532∗
0.269
4.580∗
−4.375∗
0.532∗
10.814∗
5.891∗
−9.490∗
0.519∗
−4.535∗
10.838∗
−9.316∗
0.557∗
11.474∗
5.451∗
−2.470∗
0.571∗

SE
0.007
1.021
0.961
1.134
0.091
1.287
0.930
1.026
0.095
1.339
0.869
1.053
0.097
1.238
0.979
0.968
0.088
1.370
0.931
0.516
0.101

a In this table, parameter 
kij refers to the demand-parameter estimate for variable k, ﬁrm i, product j, where k = 1 is the product-chain-speciﬁc preference
parameter, k = 2 is the direct promotion effect, k = 3 is the price∗ promotion interaction effect, and k = 4 is the variety effect, measured by N i , the average
number of products offered per ﬁrm per period, j = 1 is red delicious apples, j = 2 is granny smith apples, j = 3 is fuji apples, j = 4 is bananas, and j = 5 is
grapes. A single asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level, where “SE” is the standard error of the parameter estimate. The  i are elasticities of substitution
among products within ﬁrm i, while  is the elasticity of substitution among ﬁrms. Seasonal indicator variables are suppressed to conserve space, but are
all signiﬁcantly different from zero. The NL3SLS objective function value is given by q (Greene 1993) while R2 is the system-coefﬁcient of determination
(McElroy 1977). The  2 test statistic compares the estimated model to the “null model” with constant terms only. At 5% and 125 degrees of freedom, the
critical chi-square value is 152.094.

However, there is also considerable interest in
the validity of the CES demand system and the
insights it provides. If the elasticity of substi
tution among ﬁrms is equal to 1.0, then there
is no need to consider a nested system: Con
sumers in this case would regard retail ﬁrms
as perfect substitutes. Similarly, at the product
level, an elasticity of substitution of 1.0 implies
that all products are perfect substitutes. Based
on the results in table 3, a Wald chi-square
statistic for the hypothesis that  = 1.0 is 17.50,
while the critical value at one degree of free
dom at a 5% level is 3.84. Therefore, we clearly
reject the null hypothesis, which suggests
that a two-level nested system is preferred.
Among the product-level elasticities of substi
tution, we again reject the null hypothesis that
 i = 1.0 in each case, which implies that dif
ferent types of fruit are indeed imperfect sub
stitutes for one another.14 Further, Durbin–
Watson tests for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
among the errors of each equation in the de
mand system failed to reject the null hypothe
sis of no autocorrelation for all products in all
stores (H 0 :  ij = 0).
Anderson and de Palma (1992) raise the
issue of whether we should expect greater
differentiation (less substitutability) within a
particular ﬁrm or among different ﬁrms. In
the supermarket example, consumers choose
many types of goods to ﬁll fundamentally dif
fering needs, but each ﬁrm sells roughly simi
lar types of products. Consequently, we expect
to ﬁnd greater product differentiation within
each ﬁrm than retailer differentiation across
ﬁrms. The results in table 3 support this, as
the product-level substitution elasticities are
signiﬁcantly lower than the ﬁrm-level esti
mate. Interpreted as measures of heterogene
ity, these estimates also mean that differences
among products are perceived to be far greater
than differences among ﬁrms. Although fourpoint estimates of the product-level substitu
tion elasticities do not permit a formal test
of the hypothesis that greater product hetero
geneity leads to more variety, or longer prod
uct lines, the estimates in table 3 provide some
evidence contrary to this idea. Whereas ﬁrm 1
offers only 52.6 products on average and has
a substitution elasticity of 0.040, ﬁrm 4 offers
77.33 products and has a substitution elasticity
among products of 0.202—the highest of all our
14
The test statistic for the null hypothesis that  1 = 1.0 is 303.689,
for  2 = 1.0 is 147.053, for  3 = 1.0 is 219.775, and for  4 = 1.0
is 119.046. In each case, the test statistic is chi-square distributed
with one degree of freedom.

sample ﬁrms. Anderson’s argument maintains
that if products are not readily substitutable
for one another, a ﬁrm can introduce more
brands without fear of cannibalizing existing
sales. However, as Hamilton (2003) points out,
the cost of cannibalized sales is also larger in
this case, as retail margins increase with prod
uct differentiation. The empirical model pro
vides some evidence that the latter effect is
indeed the dominant one.
The remaining parameters in the demand
system comprise the product-level quality
functions,� ij . Whereas Morey et al. (2001) as
sume common quality parameters among each
of their primary-level choices, this alternative
was rejected in the LA retail data in favor of
product- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters. In each
case, a positive parameter estimate suggests
that the perceived “quality” or underlying
demand for the product rises in the associated
variable or, in the case of the intercept term,
that the inherent preference for the good in
question is higher than average. In this respect,
the results in table 3 indicate that consumers
in three of the four ﬁrms express a preference
for red delicious apples, while consumers in
all ﬁrms tend to favor fuji apples. Perhaps sur
prising, given the importance of bananas to
fresh produce retailing, consumers in three of
four ﬁrms tend to show a negative preference
for bananas. Given the importance consumers
place in the quality of a ﬁrm’s fresh produce,
retailers are particularly interested in the effec
tiveness of price-promotion programs for fresh
products. For virtually all products and ﬁrms,
the promotion variable represents a strongly
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on demand. A positive
value for the binary sales indicator means that
demand increases during a sale, while a nega
tive interaction term means that demand also
becomes less elastic. Both of these outcomes
are desirable from the retailer’s point of view.
While it is not the primary objective of this ar
ticle, it would be possible to calculate the proﬁt
implications of a sale in each case with the CES
demand estimates.
With respect to the demand for variety, the
ik4 parameter shows the effect on the de
mand for product k in ﬁrm i of increasing the
number of products offered within the fruit
category. Consumers may value a variety of
choices in fresh fruit if they are easily satiated
in either the taste or nutritional attributes they
desire when consuming fruit (McAlister and
Pesemier 1982; Chintagunta 1998), if they seek
a hedge against future changes in taste (Walsh
1995) or if they desire more attributes than one

Table 4. Firm-Level Price and Variety Elasticities
Elasticity of:
Q2

Q1
a

With Respect to:
P1
P2
P3
P4

ε 1k

SE
∗

−1.151
0.321∗
0.207∗
0.624∗
1k

N1
N2
N3
N4

∗

0.179
−0.226∗
−0.071∗
−0.629∗

ε 2k

Q3
SE

∗

0.011
0.048
0.020
0.072
Se

0.146
−0.976∗
0.207∗
0.624∗

0.004
0.042
0.014
0.110

∗

2k

−0.022
0.685∗
−0.071∗
−0.629∗

ε 3k

Q4
SE

∗

0.011
0.048
0.020
0.072
Se

0.146
0.321∗
−1.090∗
0.624∗

0.004
0.042
0.014
0.110

∗

3k

−0.022
−0.226∗
0.369∗
−0.629∗

ε 4k

SE

0.011
0.048
0.020
0.072
Se

∗

0.146
0.321∗
0.207∗
−0.674∗

0.011
0.048
0.020
0.072
Se

0.004
0.042
0.014
0.110

−0.022∗
−0.226∗
−0.071∗
0.675∗

0.004
0.042
0.014
0.110

4k

a In this table, all subscripts refer to chain i, so Q is the volume of sales from ﬁrm i, P is the price index for ﬁrm i, and N is the number of products offered
i
i
i
for sale by ﬁrm i. All elasticities are calculated at sample means. A single asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level where “SE” is the standard error of the
parameter estimate.

item can provide (Farquhar and Rao 1976).
Product variants in this case may mean differ
ent sizes of apple, alternative package forms,
or different colors of grape, for example. Al
though Draganska and Jain (2005) provide ar
guments for, and show empirical support for, a
concave effect of variety on market share, here
we maintain a linear relationship to keep the
model as parsimonious as possible. In general,
the results tend to be broadly positive, partic
ularly in the case of fresh grapes, where many
would argue that variety not only appeals to
consumers’ nutritional needs for diversity, but
is also visually appealing as well. These results
are similar to Draganska and Jain (2005) in yo
gurt or Bayus and Putsis (1999) in personal
computers.
Next, consider ﬁrm-level strategies. Table 4
presents estimates of “fresh fruit” price elas
ticities for each ﬁrm. Consistent with common
notions of the competitiveness of the super
market sector, the price elasticity of demand
for each ﬁrm is near unity, except for the fourth.
As expected, the ﬁrms are substitutes for
each other and, in general, strong substitutes
both in an economic and a statistical sense.
With respect to variety elasticities, all of the
own elasticities are positive and signiﬁcant,
while the cross-elasticities are negative and sig
niﬁcant. These elasticities provide some poten
tially valuable information. For example, the
fact that the second and fourth ﬁrms both face
price-inelastic demand, and relatively highvariety elasticities suggests that these ﬁrms
may beneﬁt from higher prices and longer
product lines among their fresh fruit. However,
greater insight into the strategic value of

these changes is provided by the supply-side
estimates of each ﬁrm’s price and variety
response.
These estimates are shown in table 5. Based
on the R2 value and chi-square test results re
ported in this table, the model clearly provides
a good ﬁt to the data. As in Vilcassim, Kadiyali,
and Chintagunta (1999), each structural equa
tion allows for ﬁrm-speciﬁc “multiple interac
tions” or expected price and variety responses
by rivals to a change in variety, or to a change in
price. Given that these responses are derived
in a Nash equilibrium framework, all are as
sumed to be optimal given the choices made by
other ﬁrms. By assuming general Nash behav
ior on the part of all ﬁrms, we offer a more com
prehensive analysis of product-line decisions
than Draganska and Jain (2005), who assume
Bertrand–Nash (zero conduct parameters) in
both prices and variety. With respect to price
behavior, the conjectural elasticity estimates
presented in the top panel show how rivals
are anticipated to react to changes in the price
of ﬁrm i. If the estimate is greater than zero,
rival ﬁrms are expected to raise their prices in
response to a rise in ﬁrm i’s price in a cooper
ative way. Clearly, the results in table 5 indi
cate that the retailers are far from competitive
( ik = 0). Rather, the estimates in each case
suggest a range from mildly cooperative (ﬁrm 2
with respect to ﬁrm 4) to strongly cooperative
(ﬁrm 2 with respect to ﬁrm 3). These results
also suggest that price and variety are strate
gic complements as each ﬁrm expects its rivals
to increase the number of products they offer
in response to an increase in the ﬁrm’s own
price. One explanation for a positive variety

Table 5. LA Supermarket Price and Variety Response Elasticities, 1998–99
Firm 1
Estimate
i1
i2
i3
i4
i1
i2
i3
i4

 i1
 i3
 i13
i1
i2
i1
i2
i3
i4
i1
i2
i3
i4

q
2
R2

1.000
0.458∗
0.565∗
0.326∗
1.000∗
0.425∗
0.149∗
0.134∗
0.104∗
−0.407∗
0.010∗
−2.826∗
0.371∗
1.000
−0.210∗
0.412∗
0.160∗
1.000
0.146∗
1.058∗
0.380∗
437.705
212.734
0.996

Firm 2
t-Ratio
NA
0.020
0.023
0.015
NA
0.024
0.003
0.011
0.050
0.052
0.004
0.137
0.014
NA
0.055
0.005
0.056
NA
0.006
0.007
0.046

Estimate
∗

0.403
1.000
0.678∗
0.072∗
0.126∗
1.000
0.683∗
0.030∗
1.969∗
1.347∗
0.424∗
−1.540∗
0.859∗
−0.149
1.000
1.118∗
−0.566∗
1.155∗
1.000
1.306∗
−0.309∗

Firm 3
t-Ratio
0.023
NA
0.024
0.016
0.003
NA
0.022
0.013
0.098
0.051
0.043
0.185
0.053
0.080
NA
0.075
0.076
0.073
NA
0.074
0.055

Estimate
∗

0.455
0.158∗
1.000
0.239∗
1.210∗
0.186∗
1.000
0.139∗
0.608∗
0.824∗
0.142∗
0.077∗
10.999∗
0.082∗
−0.058∗
1.000
−0.001
0.013
−0.035∗
1.000∗
0.002∗

Firm 4
t-Ratio
0.034
0.020
NA
0.017
0.049
0.032
NA
0.012
0.027
0.044
0.010
0.032
0.037
0.009
0.008
NA
0.002
0.018
0.011
NA
−0.013

Estimate
∗

0.232
0.136∗
0.127∗
1.000
0.211∗
0.221∗
0.053
1.000
0.458∗
−0.102∗
0.081∗
2.428∗
10.909∗
0.052∗
−0.043∗
0.017∗
1.000
0.015
−0.018∗
0.009
1.000

t-Ratio
0.005
0.004
0.004
NA
0.005
0.006
0.041
NA
0.029
0.032
0.011
0.030
0.039
0.011
0.006
0.007
NA
0.014
0.009
0.009
NA

a In this table,
ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price with respect to price changes by ﬁrm i, ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s variety with
respect to price changes by ﬁrm i, ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s variety with respect to the number of products offered by ﬁrm i, ik is the
conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price with respect to the number of products offered by ﬁrm i, and  il and im are parameters of the retailing and variety cost
functions, respectively. To keep the response-system parameter space as small as possible, two input price indices are used: retail and wholesale wages and
advertising costs. A single asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level, where “SE” is the standard error of the parameter estimate. q is the NL3SLS objective
function value, while R2 is the system-coefﬁcient of determination (McElroy 1977). At 5% and 60 degrees of freedom, the critical chi-square value is 79.082.

response to price is as follows: If ﬁrm i raises its
retail price, this allows ﬁrm j to capture market
share, and ﬁrm j will tend to increase its own
retail price in response. To maintain its higher
iso-proﬁt curve, and prevent erosion of market
share back to ﬁrm i, ﬁrm j increases variety as
well. Higher prices appear to intensify variety
competition among retailers. As a result, su
permarkets appear to behave cooperatively in
their pricing decisions for fresh fruit, both in re
sponse to rival price and product-line choices.
The bottom panel of table 5 shows that va
riety decisions are less uniform with respect to
their implications for retailer strategy. With re
spect to the expected variety response of rivals
to changes in a ﬁrm’s own product variety (the
ik parameters), a positive elasticity suggests
that product lines are strategic complements—
if one ﬁrm lengthens its product line, the other
ﬁrms respond by increasing the number of va
rieties they offer as well. It is unclear whether
variety proliferation by one ﬁrm leads to such

reciprocation by its rivals. Firm 1 expects all re
tailers to respond to an increase in its product
line with countervailing increases in their own
product lines, but ﬁrms 3 and 4 expect ﬁrm 2
to counter an increase in product variety with
a contraction in its product line.
The ik parameters in table 5 show the con
jectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price with respect
to the number of products offered by ﬁrm i.
A positive elasticity, therefore, suggests that
product lines are strategic complements—if
one ﬁrm product line, it will be able to raise
its price, thus leaving more of the market for
the other ﬁrms. As in the case of a simple
price increase described above, with more mar
ket share the other ﬁrm can raise its price to
extract more surplus (as suggested by the pos
itive ik elasticities in table 5), or may either
shrink their product lines to reduce cost, or
lengthen them to build more pricing power.
Nonetheless, it is unclear from table 5 whether
variety competition softens or stiffens price

competition. Firm 1 appears to make product
line decisions on the expectation that ﬁrm 2
will respond to an increase in variety with
a price decrease, but ﬁrms 3 and 4 will re
spond in a cooperative fashion with price in
creases. Moreover, each ﬁrm expects ﬁrm 3 to
respond cooperatively to a product-line expan
sion. The lack of uniformity of variety-induced
responses may be due to the fact that changes
in product line are not generally as transparent
as prices. Supermarkets tend not to advertise
many of the minor products they offer, but typ
ically publish as many prices as possible on a
weekly basis. However, we can make a general
conclusion that retailers, on average, appear
to cooperate in both price and product-line
decisions.
Further, because price elasticities in the CES
model depend upon the elasticity of substi
tution among products, the results in table 5
can also be interpreted as indirect tests of the
ﬁrm-heterogeneity hypothesis outlined in the
“introduction” section. In the lower block of
results shown in table 5, a positive conjectural
elasticity estimate ( ik ) suggests that ﬁrm i will
offer more products for sale the higher the
cross-price elasticity of demand, or the less het
erogeneous it perceives the retail market to be.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the theoretical
predictions of both Hamilton (2003) and An
derson and de Palma (1992). The intuition for
this is that if ﬁrms are largely viewed as homo
geneous by consumers, then each will seek to
differentiate itself by offering a greater range
of products, increasing overall demand in the
market by drawing consumption from the out
side good. If doing so causes other ﬁrms to raise
their prices in response to the overall increase
in demand, then they each have further incen
tive to offer more variety. Although this pro
cess is limited by the rising cost of variety (note
the convexity of each of the variety cost func
tions in table 5), it can perhaps explain in part
the rise of supercenters and other “big box” re
tailers in markets such as children’s toys, con
sumer electronics, and books.
Conclusions and Implications
This article provides some empirical evidence
on the strategic interaction of pricing and
product-line decisions made by supermarket
retailers. Theoretical models of price and va
riety competition suggest that retailer hetero
geneity reduces variety, or the length of a
ﬁrm’s product line, while product heterogene

ity increases equilibrium variety. While other
studies investigate this question using restric
tive, nested-logit-based models, this is the ﬁrst
to empirically test the variety/heterogeneity
relationship using a ﬂexible, nested CES
model.
The data used in this article consists of two
years of weekly scanner data for four ma
jor retail ﬁrms in the LA market. We use
data from an unbranded, fresh product cat
egory in order to minimize the inﬂuence of
manufacturer interference in retail-sales deci
sions and to gain access to accurate and rele
vant wholesale price data. These data are used
to estimate a fully structural system of fresh
fruit demand and ﬁrst-order conditions with
respect to ﬁrm-level prices and product num
bers. With this approach, the estimated conjec
tural elasticities represent retailers’ response
to ﬁrm heterogeneity in price and variety
strategies.
Estimates of the demand system provide a
number of interesting results. First, we ﬁnd a
lower elasticity of substitution among products
within each ﬁrm than among ﬁrms, as expected
given the similarity of product offerings among
supermarkets. Second, we ﬁnd considerable
support for research among consumer prod
uct goods retailing (Chintagunta 2002) that
ﬁnds price promotion to be highly effective in
increasing product-level market share. Third,
variety does indeed have a strongly positive
impact on sales volume in a particular product
line. Fourth, we ﬁnd that sales at the ﬁrm level
are nearly approximately unit-elastic with re
spect to price, and uniformly positively related
to ﬁrm-level measures of variety.
Using the demand system estimates, we then
estimate price and variety response equations
that allow for multiple strategic interactions
between rival ﬁrm’s price and variety deci
sions. Of primary interest among these esti
mates, we ﬁnd that each ﬁrm tends to follow a
“cooperative” or complementary variety strat
egy with respect to certain rivals, but that such
cooperation does not exist among all retailers.
Following different variety strategies with re
spect to some rivals is likely driven by per
ceived proximities in other respects, such as
location, price levels, or private-label strate
gies. Further, we use these estimates to test
the hypothesis that greater ﬁrm-level hetero
geneity leads to a smaller assortment of prod
ucts offered per ﬁrm. We ﬁnd some support
for this hypothesis; however, the results do not
support the corollary hypothesis of Anderson
and de Palma (1992) that greater product-level

heterogeneity leads to longer product lines.
This result is consistent with the countervail
ing effects of product variety suggested by
Hamilton (2003).
While this research provides many impli
cations for the extent of competitive inter
actions among supermarket retailers, perhaps
the most important concerns the consequences
for how the supermarket industry is likely to
evolve. Driven by factors outside their imme
diate market niche, namely competition from
other store formats, traditional supermarkets
of the type we study here have been reducing
retail prices in real terms in a number of cate
gories. The empirical model suggests that such
reductions in price are likely to lead product
variety to respond in the same direction, lead
ing to smaller product assortments and shorter
product lines. In fact, this is precisely what is
occurring now. Through “efﬁcient assortment”
and category management programs, super
markets are reducing SKU counts throughout
the store in order to save inventory and han
dling costs as well as to allow the introduction
of their own private-label brands.
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